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TEAMSTERS, CALIFORNIA BREWERS, AND
BEYOND: SENIORITY SYSTEMS AND
ALLOCATION OF THE BURDEN OF
PROVING BONA FIDES
PETER N. HILLMAN*
INTRODUCTION
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,1
the Supreme Court unsettled years of Title VII jurisprudence2 by
declaring that section 703(h)s of the Civil Rights Act of 19644 im-
munizes bona fide seniority systems5 from challenge, even where
such systems operate to perpetuate the effects of pre-Title VII dis-
crimination.6 Yet, the significance of the Teamsters holding re-
* B.A., Williams College, 1975; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1978. Associ-
ate, Chadbourne, Parke, Whiteside & Wolff, New York, N.Y.
1 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
2 See Recent Development, Title VII-Seniority-The Relevant Scope of Inquiry for
Determining the Legality of a Seniority System, 31 VAND. L. REv. 151, 170 (1978).
In the Teamsters majority opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart conceded that there was "much
support" for the view that section 703(h) did not immunize seniority systems that perpetu-
ate the effects of past discrimination. 431 U.S. at 346 n.28. The leading case in this line of
decisions, Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968), held that if a
seniority system had its "genesis" in racial discrimination, it was not bona fide within sec-
tion 703(h). For a listing of over thirty decisions where the Quarles approach was followed,
see 431 U.S. at 378 & n.2 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Mar-
shall also pointed out that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission invariably
reached the same conclusion as the Quarles court. Id. at 379-80 & n.4 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part).
3 Section 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976), provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlaw-
ful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compen-
sation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a
bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quan-
tity or quality of production or to employees who work in different locations, pro-
vided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate be-
cause of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
6 See note 92 infra.
6 431 U.S. at 353-54. In Teamsters, the United States brought suit on behalf of certain
employees of a nationwide carrier alleging, inter alia, that the seniority system contained in
the collective bargaining contract between the company and the Teamsters Union violated
Title VII. Id. at 329-30. Specifically, the Government alleged that the effects of the carrier's
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mains shadowed by the Court's failure to resolve the critical ques-
tion of which party has the burden of proving that a seniority
system is or is not bona fide. Lower courts have been forced to
confront this question in the context of complex employment dis-
crimination litigation with little guidance from Teamsters, and
have responded with a variety of approaches.
pre-Act practice of hiring minorities solely for inferior positions was perpetuated by its pre-
sent seniority system. Id. at 329. Under that system, minority employees who transferred to
the more desirable positions were forced to forfeit their seniority. Id. at 329-30. The district
court found that the seniority system violated Title VII since it impeded "transfer of minor-
ity groups into and within the company." Id. at 331. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed, holding that an employee who transferred to a more desirable position was entitled
to use his full company seniority for all purposgs, regardless of whether the seniority would
predate the effective date of Title VII. Id. at 333.
On appeal, the Supreme Court made a distinction between those employees who were
victimized by discrimination before Title VII, and those discriminated against after the Act
took effect. Id. at 347-57. Post-Act discriminatees are clearly entitled to retroactive seniority
under the authority of a previous decision of the Court, which stated that section 703(h)
would not bar such an award. Id. at 346; see Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747
(1976). However, section 703(h) would bar retroactive relief to pre-Act discriminatees be-
cause the purpose of this section was to declare that "routine application of a bona fide
seniority system would not be unlawful under Title VII." 431 U.S. at 352. In arriving at this
conclusion, the Court looked not only to the language of section 703(h), but also to its legis-
lative history, which indicated that the section was added to placate those critics of the Act
who complained that it would destroy existing seniority rights. Id. at 350. For a discussion
of the effect of Teamsters on seniority systems in general, see Sellinger, Seniority and the
Perpetuation of Past Discrimination, 4 N.Y.U. SCH. OF L. ANN. SURVEY OF Am. L. 749
(1978).
7 See notes 116-19 and accompanying text infra. The Teamsters Court not only failed
to resolve the issue of who has the burden of proving bona fides, but also left unresolved the
issue of which employment practices were part of a "seniority system" and, therefore, sub-
ject to a bona fides test. See notes 132 & 133 and accompanying text infra. Recently, how-
ever, in California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598 (1980), the Court took a signifi-
cant step in clarifying this latter issue. The California Brewers Court noted that the
"principal feature of any and every 'seniority system' is that preferential treatment is dis-
pensed on the basis of some measure of time served in employment." Id. at 606. In addition,
the Court observed that "ancillary rules"-rules specifying the onset of seniority rights,
rules describing the forfeiture of seniority rights, rules defining seniority accruals, and rules
particularizing the employment conditions that will be governed or influenced by senior-
ity-although not dependent on the length of employment, could nonetheless be identified
as part of a "seniority system." Id. at 607. Thus, a rule requiring that employees work 45
weeks before they receive preferential treatment in hiring and layoffs was considered such
an "ancillary rule" or threshold requirement for application of other seniority rules. Conse-
quently, the California Brewers Court held that the provision was part of the "seniority
system." Id. at 609. For a more complete discussion of the nature of seniority rights, see
Sellinger, supra note 6, at 765-68.
Although the issue of burden of proof as to bona fides was not presented to the Califor-
nia Brewers Court, Justice Stewart, author of the plurality opinion, after having concluded
that a seniority system was implicated, observed that the plaintiffs were "free to show that
...the seniority system. . .[was] not 'bona fide,' or that the differences in employment
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Regardless of whether the discrimination being analyzed is
overt and purposeful, ("disparate treatment") or the result of
facially neutral programs, ("disparate impact") the Supreme Court
has affirmed that the burden of proof in Title VII cases is the same
as that in other forms of civil litigation. Plaintiffs who seek to es-
tablish discrimination, whether suing as individuals or as a class,
"have the traditional civil litigation burden of establishing that the
acts they complain of constituted discrimination in violation of
Title VII."8 The conclusion herein, that plaintiffs should have the
burden of proving non-bona fides is in harmony with disparate
treatment analysis and is also supported by general concepts of
statutory interpretation that place on plaintiffs the burden of
proving the nonexistence of an, exception, such as section 703(h),
which is part of the general clause or paragraph of the statute that
creates and defines the right relied upon." Accordingly, plaintiffs
who allege that a challenged act or practice of the employer vio-
lates the primary prohibition of Title VII must prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the act or practice is indeed an "un-
lawful employment practice" as that term is defined by section
703(a).10
conditions that it [had] produced [were] 'the result of an intention to discriminate because
of race.'" 444 U.S. at 610-11.
8 General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 137 n.14 (1976); see, e.g., International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 367-68; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Notions of burden of proof in employment discrimination litiga-
tion have evolved in a "sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common
experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination." Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). As in other forms of civil litigation, the burden may shift
from party to party. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802-03. Thus, if a
plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the
inference of a violation. See id. If the defendant successfully rebuts the inference, the bur-
den is shifted back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's purported reason for its
practice is in fact pretext. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at
360-61; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
o See notes 90 & 91 and accompanying text infra.
1o Section 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976), provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. Section 703(a) is one of several clauses in Title VII defining and conferring a right to
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The central thesis of this Article is that, given the underlying
policy considerations, the burden of proving the bona fides of a
seniority system should be allocated as it is in disparate treatment
cases.11 Discriminatory motive, which is critical in these cases,
must be proved by the plaintiffs.
12
GENERAL CONCEPTS OF BURDEN OF PROOF IN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION
Burdens of Proof in Cases of Disparate Treatment
Although Title VII does not define "discrimination,"13 Con-
gress obviously contemplated that the term would include the em-
ployer who treats individuals differently because of personal antip-
athy toward the minority group that includes those individuals.' 4
To implement the Congressional purpose of discouraging employ-
ers who overtly distinguished among individuals because of race,
the concept of disparate treatment evolved.1 5 The critical element
for proving this type of discrimination became the presence or ab-
sence of the employer's unlawful subjective intent.21 In developing
the concepts of burden of proof in disparate treatment cases, the
Supreme Court has never lost sight of the principle that the bur-
seek redress for unlawful job discrimination. Other "unlawful employment practices" are
defined and proscribed with respect to practices by employment agencies, section 703(b), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1976), by labor organizations, section 703(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)
(1976), and as part of training programs, section 703(d), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1976).
" It must be recognized that the phrase "burden of proof," as applied in this Article,
embodies two concepts: (1) the burden of persuasion as to a fact or issue, which generally
rests on the party asserting or pleading it to finally establish by the requisite degree of
proof; and (2) the burden of production or going forward, a shifting burden which can be
defined as the necessity that a party establish a prima facie case in his favor or refute evi-
dence introduced against it at specified times during a trial. See Northwestern Elec. Co. v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 134 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1943), af'd, 321 U.S. 119 (1944); Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. SEC, 127 F.2d 378, 382 (9th Cir. 1942), aff'd per curiam, 324 U.S. 826
(1945); Wong Kam Chong v. United States, 111 F.2d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1940).
1 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15.
IS See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-2(h) (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
S 5. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEWS 2355, 2356; H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprinted in [1964] U.S.
CODE CONG. & An. NEws 2391, 2393; see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31
(1971).
5 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15; 110
CONG. REC. 13088 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
" International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15; McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803 (1973). In Teamsters, the Court noted that al-
though "proof of discriminatory intent is critical," it can sometimes "be inferred from the
mere fact of differences in treatment." 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
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den is on the plaintiff to prove the defendant's discriminatory ani-
mus in order to establish that a violation has occurred. 17 Such
proof of racial animus can be direct, when there is a deliberate de-
nial of employment opportunities based on overt discriminatory
acts, or indirect, established by inference from circumstantial evi-
dence that reveals the employer's state of mind."
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,9 the Supreme Court
faced the "critical issue" of "the order and allocation of proof in a
private, non-class action challenging employment discrimina-
tion. ' 20 In resolving this question, the Court enunciated a three-
step process for distributing burdens among the parties and set
forth the elements of proof necessary to establish a disparate treat-
ment case under Title VII. The first step requires that the plaintiff
establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination by showing
that he was a member of a racial minority group; that he applied
for a job for which applicants were being sought; that although
qualified, he was rejected; and that after his rejection, the em-
ployer continued to seek equally qualified applicants.2
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case sufficient to
support an inference of discrimination, the burden of production
" International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 (citing Village
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977)); see
Naraine v. Western Elec. Co., 507 F.2d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1974).
S See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1154 & n.16 (1976)
& 300-01 (Supp. 1979). Although statistical evidence has often been used to establish dis-
criminatory purpose in cases of disparate impact, such evidence alone may no longer be
sufficient in cases of disparate treatment. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. at 339-40.
"9 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
2 Id. at 800.
2 Id. at 802; see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). The McDon-
nell Douglas Court pointed out, however, that the proof required of a plaintiff to establish a
prima facie case will vary with "differing factual situations." 411 U.S. at 802 n.13. This
caveat was reiterated by the Court in Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978),
wherein the Court stated:
The central focus of the inquiry in [disparate treatment cases] is always
whether the employer is treating "some people less favorably than others because
of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." The method suggested in
McDonnell Douglas for pursuing this inquiry, however, was never intended to be
rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a sensible, orderly way to
evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical
question of discrimination.
Id. at 576-77 (quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 335
n.15).
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shifts to the defendant to rebut the inference. 22 McDonnell Doug-
las described this burden on the defendant as that of "articu-
lat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the em-
ployee's rejection."23 Assuming the defendant can articulate some
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action, its burden of
production is satisfied, the inferences drawn from the plaintiff's
prima facie case have been rebutted, and the burden of production
shifts again.2 The plaintiff must then show that the presumptively
valid reasons for his rejection were mere pretext and "in fact a
coverup for a racially discriminatory decision. '25 By placing the
burden of showing pretext on the plaintiffs in these disparate
treatment cases, the Court implemented traditional burden of
proof principles in consonance with the underlying congressional
policy proscribing overt acts of discrimination. 26
Burdens of Proof in Cases of Disparate Impact
In the first years after the enactment of Title VII, courts de-
fined discrimination in terms of the employer's good or bad subjec-
22 411 U.S. at 802; see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
21 411 U.S. at 802. It should be noted that there is a "significant distinction between
merely 'articulat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason' and 'prov[ing] absence of
discriminatory motive.'" Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (19"78) (per curiam)
(quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802); see Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80 (1978). In other words, if a plaintiff makes a McDonnell Doug-
las prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the defendant, not to prove that it acted with-
out discriminatory animus, but to "'[explain] what he has done' or 'produc[e] evidence of
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons.'" 439 U.S. at 25 n.2 (quoting dissent of Justice Ste-
vens, id. at 28-29). Prima facie evidence does not constitute a finding of discrimination, but
merely creates an inference of discriminatory motive "because experience has proved that in
the absence of any other explanation it is more likely than not that those actions were
bottomed on impermissible considerations." Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. at
580. Furnco Constr. Corp. and Sweeney have been followed by the lower courts. See, e.g.,
Cartagena v. Secretary of the Navy, 618 F.2d 130, 133 (1st Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Reilly v.
Board of Educ., 458 F. Supp. 992, 996 (E.D. Wis. 1978). But see Burdine v. Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs, 608 F.2d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S.Ct. 3009 (1980)
(rebuttal of plaintiff's prima facie case requires "legally sufficient proof" of nondiscrimina-
tory reasons). See also Johnson v. Olin Corp., 484 F. Supp. 577, 581 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
24 See 411 U.S. at 804-05.
22 Id. The McDonnell Douglas Court suggested what evidence would be relevant to a
showing of pretext, all of which bears on the pivotal question of the defendant's discrimina-
tory intent. See id. at 804-05. For example, if the defendant's refusal to rehire the minority
employee was purportedly based on one nondiscriminatory criterion, an inference of racial
animus might still be drawn if that criterion was not applied alike in decisions to rehire
white employees. See id. at 804.
26 See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
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tive intent. Even before McDonnell Douglas, however, a second
concept of discrimination had emerged, focusing more on the con-
sequences of an employer's actions, than on the employer's state of
mind.28 Under this rationale, Title VII was interpreted to reach ac-
tions by employers that had an adverse, or "disparate," impact on
minorities, even though the particular employer might not have
had a history of practicing overt discrimination." This sharp con-
ceptual shift from subjective to objective circumstances required
separate principles of burden of proof.
A review of these early disparate impact cases reveals that the
mechanics of seniority and lines of progression were crucial consid-
erations in shaping disparate impact analysis.30 In Quarles v.
Philip Morris, Inc.,3 1 for example, the employer's policy of segre-
gated departments had been abolished earlier, but a current sys-
tem of restrictive interdepartmental transfers, with accompanying
loss of competitive seniority, was alleged to perpetuate unlawfully
the effects of past discrimination. 2 The employer contended that
there was no intent to discriminate, since the seniority system was
facially neutral, and its application restricted alike the transfers of
all employees.33 Consequently, the employer argued, it should be
protected by section 703(h) of Title VIIL 4
Notwithstanding the employer's arguments in Quarles, Dis-
trict Judge Butzner concluded from the section's legislative history
that Congress, without endorsing reverse discrimination, "did not
intend to freeze an entire generation of Negro employees into dis-
27 See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 796-97 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416
F.2d 980, 996 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
21 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971); United States v. Beth-
lehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 1971); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F.
Supp. 505, 510 (E.D. Va. 1968).
29 See cases cited in note 28 supra.
20 See, e.g., United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 471 F.2d 582, 587 (4th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 939 (1973); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 46 F.2d 652, 659
(2d Cir. 1971); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 795-96 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
404 U.S. 1006 (1971). See also California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, rehearing
denied, 444 U.S. 957 (1980).
31 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
32 Id. at 507-08. The plaintiff in Quarles, a black worker, sought with other workers to
enjoin certain employment practices of the defendant company, alleging that Philip Morris
did not "hire, promote .... pay, advance and transfer" black employees as it did white
employees. Id. at 507.
33 Id. at 515.
3, Id.; see note 3 supra.
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criminatory patterns that existed before the Act. ' 5 He held that a
seniority system having its genesis in past discrimination, such as a
history of segregated departments, was not bona fide because it
perpetuated the effects of a pre-Act policy of discriminatory job
assignment.3 6
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted the
Quarles approach in Local 189, United Papermakers &
Paperworkers v. United States.37 In condemning a departmental
seniority system over the defendant's argument that the facially
neutral practice was "merely an ineradicable consequence of ex-
tinct racial discrimination,"38 the court emphasized that discrimi-
nation in the seniority system context should be analyzed in terms
of the present consequences of past discrimination. 9 Other courts
began to accept this emphasis on the present consequences of past
discrimination, 0 and the Supreme Court finally approved the the-
ory in a different factual context in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.4 2
In Griggs, the Court was faced with a class action challenging
the legality of an employer's use of high school diplomas and gen-
eral intelligence tests as employment requirements, both of which
operated to render a disproportionate number of blacks ineligible
for employment.' 2 The tests were challenged under the second part
of section 703(h), which proscribes the application of tests
31 279 F. Supp. at 576.
36 Id. at 519.
37 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
31 Id. at 986. Prior to May 1964, the lines of progression in the paper mill which em-
ployed the Local 189 plaintiffs were segregated according to race. Id. at 983. These divided
lists were subsequently merged, with rank on the new list supposedly based on seniority. Id.
But more seniority was given to those on the pre-1964 "white" lists than to those on the
"black" lists. Id. at 983-84.
3" Id. at 989, 994. The court's language made clear that, in contrast to disparate treat-
ment cases, the employer's present good or bad subjective intent was immaterial:
Every time a Negro worker [who was] hired under the old segregated system bids
against a white worker in his job slot, the old racial classification reasserts itself,
and the Negro suffers anew for his employer's previous bias. It is not decisive
therefore that a seniority system may appear to be neutral on its face if the inevi-
table effect of tying the system to the past is to cut into the employees present
right not to be discriminated against on the ground of race.
Id. at 988 (emphasis in original).
40 See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 795 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
404 U.S. 1006 (1971). Justice Marshall, dissenting in Teamsters, cited thirty decisions of six
courts of appeals which had held that a seniority system is unlawful if it perpetuates the
effects of prior discrimination. See 431 U.S. at 378 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
41 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
40 Id. at 425-28.
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"designed, intended or used to discriminate. '4 The district court
found that the defendant had ceased its policy of overt racial dis-
crimination upon the adoption of Title VII.44 The Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that there was
no showing of a "racial purpose" or "invidious intent" by the em-
ployer in adopting the diploma requirement and intelligence test.4"
Moreover, the standard had been applied fairly to all, regardless of
race. 46 Since there was no showing that the defendant had acted
with discriminatory intent, the court of appeals found the practices
to be lawful under Title VII.47
The Supreme Court reversed, 48 stating that Title VII pro-
scribed "not only overt discrimination but also practices that are
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. '49 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court determined that the policy behind the Title
VII proscription extended beyond cases of overt disparate treat-
ment,50 stating that "Congress directed the thrust of the [Civil
Rights] Act to the consequences of employment practices, not sim-
ply the motivation."5 1 Clearly, under this approach, evidence of the
employer's good or bad subjective intent was immaterial. Further-
more, in the view of the Griggs Court, Congress had assigned to
the employer the "burden of showing that any given requirement
[has] a manifest relationship to the employment in question." 52
To reflect the shift away from the employer's subjective in-
tent, variations had to be incorporated into the levels of burden of
proof. The initial burden on plaintiffs in disparate impact cases is
to show "that the tests [or other facially neutral requirements] in
question select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
"' Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243, 251 (M.D.N.C. 1968), modified, 420 F.2d
1225 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
" 420 F.2d at 1232-33.
4e Id.
"' Id. at 1235-36 & n.10.
48 401 U.S. at 436.
19 Id. at 431.
50 Id. at 429-32. The Griggs Court stated that "practices, procedures, or tests neutral on
their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to
'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." Id. at 430.
51 Id. at 432 (emphasis deleted).
2 Id. The Griggs Court explained that while Title VII preserves an employer's right to
impose criteria which bear directly on job qualifications, id. at 434, criteria which are "artifi-
cial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers" to equal employment opportunities must be re-
moved. Id. at 431. See note 59 infra.
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significantly different from that of the pool of applicants."5 The
most frequent way of satisfying this initial burden is by evidence
of statistical disparity, a device used since the first days of Title
VII litigation." The burden of production then shifts to the em-
ployer to show "that any given requirement [has] a manifest rela-
tionship to the employment in question." 55
If the defendant can meet its burden of showing that its re-
quirements are "job-related," the burden of production shifts again
to the plaintiffs to show pretext, that the defendant had available
alternative testing or selection devices which would "serve the em-
ployer's legitimate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy workman-
ship,'" while not producing an "undesirable racial effect. 56
In summary, the distinguishing feature of disparate impact
cases is that the plaintiff is asserting that a facially neutral qualifi-
cation standard constitutes an "artificial, arbitrary, and unneces-
sary barrier" that disproportionately excludes minorities from the
51 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). In Albemarle, the plaintiff
class of present and former black workers sought injunctive relief for what was alleged to be
a discriminatory seniority system. Id. at 408-09. They claimed that the pre-1968 lines of
progression were overtly racist and that a 1968 collective bargaining agreement "locked" the
black workers into lower paying jobs by placing the black lines of progression beneath white
seniority lists. Id. at 409. Also at issue were the defendant's policies of requiring a high
school diploma and using the Beta and Wonderlic tests to test nonverbal and verbal skills,
respectively. Id. at 427. The Court found defects in the employer's validation study which
showed a correlation between the test results and job performance. Id. at 431. In support of
this conclusion, the Court noted that the Beta test showed a substantial correlation in less
than half of the contested lines of progression, id. at 431-32, that the study validated test
results with "subjective supervisorial rankings," id. at 432-33, that the study centered on
those employees close to the top of their lines of progression, id. at 433-34, and that the
study focused on experienced white workers, while the tests were given to new job appli-
cants who were usually younger, inexperienced, and nonwhite, id. at 435.
" See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977); Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 339, 342 n.23; Green v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 528 F.2d 1102, 1105 (8th Cir. 1976). See generally Peters v. Jefferson Chemi-
cal Corp., 516 F.2d 447, 450 (5th Cir. 1975). For an extended discussion of the accepted use
of statistics in proving a prima facie case of employment discrimination, see B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRMINATION LAW (1976 & Supp. 1979).
"5 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 432. In seeking a "manifest relationship"
between employment requirements and job qualifications, the courts should approve a test
that will "measure the person for the job and not the person in the abstract." Id. at 436. See
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906
(5th Cir. 1973). For the federal guidelines to be used in determining a test's validity in
relation to the job sought, see 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1979).
11 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (citing McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973)). But see Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494
F.2d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1974) (employer's duty to show that there was no less discriminatory
method of achieving the same goal). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3(B) (1979).
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terms and benefits of employment.57 "The gist of the [plaintiff's]
claim," the Supreme Court stated in a recent disparate impact
case, "does not involve an assertion of purposeful discriminatory
motive. ' 58 Thus, under disparate impact analysis, plaintiffs need
not prove the employer's discriminatory motive; instead, the em-
ployer must justify its practice by proving "business necessity. ' 59
Early Application of Disparate Impact Theory to Seniority
Systems
In reviewing the legislative history of section 703(h), Judge
Butzner, in Quarles, concluded that Congress could not have envi-
sioned "freezing" an entire generation of blacks into inferior posi-
tions.60 This language with respect to the present consequences of
past discrimination was drawn on heavily by Chief Justice Burger
in his opinion in Griggs61 Although Griggs did not deal with se-
niority systems, it is not surprising that there was little challenge
in the period between Griggs and Teamsters to the view that a
seniority system could be attacked under disparate impact analysis
as maintaining the unlawful effects of past discriminatory
practices.8 2
Once courts had decided that challenges to seniority systems
invoked the same sort of policy considerations as presented by
:7 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 429-31.
" Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328 (1977).
" Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 431. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15. Exactly what constitutes "business necessity" has
been the subject of considerable disagreement. See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN,
supra note 18, at 132-65; Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and
the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 81-89 (1972). Some
courts have considered efficiency as well as economy as bases for business necessity, see, e.g.,
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006
(1971), while other courts have stressed that a concern must be absolutely essential to meet
the "business necessity" requirement, see, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446
F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 250 (10th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 549 (1971); accord, United States v. Jacksonville Terminal
Co., 451 F.2d 418, 451 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972).
:0 279 F. Supp. at 516-17.
01 Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971) with Quarles v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516 (E.D. Va. 1968).
62 See, e.g., Kaplan v. International Alliance of Theatrical & Stage Employees, 525 F.2d
1354, 1360 (9th Cir. 1975); Gamble v. Birmingham So. R.R., 514 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1975);
Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1975). For a discussion of the
perpetuation of discrimination theory, see Developments in the Law-Employment Dis-
crimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1210-12
(1971).
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challenges to employment tests and educational requirements,6 3 it
was easy to apply the disparate impact levels of burden of proof to
the seniority system case." Accordingly, under disparate impact
analysis, the defendant had to show business necessity to justify a
seniority system which perpetuated the effects of past discrimina-
tion,"5 whereas plaintiffs could establish a prima facie case by
showing that the seniority system functioned as a barrier to the
eradication of past discriminatory practices. 66
Given the analytical hindsight of Teamsters, it seems appar-
ent that Quarles and its progeny did not recognize the policy con-
siderations that were the basis of section 703(h).6 Influenced first
by Quarles and then Griggs, courts failed to consider the possibil-
ity that Congress intended to protect the interests of employees
with vested seniority rights, absent overt acts of discrimination in
the seniority system itself. 8 The courts, however, too quickly ap-
plied disparate impact analysis on the assumption that Congress
intended to outlaw the present consequences of past discrimina-
tion. A less automatic response would have revealed that Congress
intended instead to carve out of the prohibitory language of sec-
tion 703(a) a special exception from liability for bona fide seniority
systems, an exception according immunity to defendants absent a
showing of overt discrimination. 9 It is submitted that such a show-
63 See, e.g., Watkins v. United Steel Workers, Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41, 45-46 (5th Cir.
1975).
See notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra.
65 See United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 451 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); note 59 and accompanying text supra. In Jacksonville
Terminal, the Fifth Circuit held .that management convenience alone could not constitute
"business necessity" and thereby validate its seniority system. 451 F.2d at 451. Rather the
defendant must prove that the seniority system is essential to the goals of safety and effi-
ciency of operation. Id.
" See, e.g., Gibson v. Local 40, Int'l Longshoreman's and Warehouseman's Union, 543
F.2d 1259, 1267-68 (9th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 313-14 (6th
Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 951 (1977); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354,
366-67 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 471 F.2d 582, 587-88 (4th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 939 (1973).
67 See, e.g., United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 471 F.2d 582, 587-88 (4th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 939 (1973); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d
652, 658-59 (2d Cir. 1971); Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States,
416 F.2d 980, 987-88 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
68 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 346 & n.28, 352-53.
69 See id. at 352-53; 110 CONG. Rac. 7207, 12723 (1964); notes 82-84 infra.
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ing requires proof of discriminatory motive.
Franks and Teamsters: Redefining the Meaning of Section 703(h)
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.70 was the first Su-
preme Court case to interpret the policy behind section 703(h).
The Franks Court held, inter alia, that section 703(h) did not pro-
hibit the retroactive award of seniority status to plaintiffs who
were denied employment because of their race in violation of Title
VII.7' In reaching its conclusion, the Court emphasized that the
plaintiffs were not challenging the present seniority system, but
were merely seeking the seniority status "they would have individ-
ually enjoyed under the .present system but for the illegal discrimi-
natory refusal to hire. '72 This distinction was of crucial signifi-
cance, since the Court stressed that Title VII was to have no effect
on existing, pre-Act seniority rights.7" Referring to Senator
Humphrey's statement that "section 703(h) was not designed to
alter the meaning of Title VII generally, but rather 'merely clari-
fies its present intent and effect,' ",74 the Franks Court read section
703(h) as being definitional only, intended by Congress to clarify
"what is and is not an illegal discriminatory practice" under sec-
tion 703(a) in cases challenging the present operation of seniority
systems which perpetuate pre-Act discrimination."5
The scope of section 703(h) was addressed by the Court the
following year in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States.7" In Teamsters, the Court faced the question of
whether section 703(h) could be interpreted as protecting a bona
fide seniority system which perpetuated pre-Title VII discrimina-
tion.77 The Government in this "pattern or practice" case,78 argued
70 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
71 Id. at 761-62.
72 Id. at 758. Section 703(h), said the Court, "does not expressly purport to qualify or
proscribe relief otherwise appropriate" under Title VII when a violation of the Act is
demonstrated. Id. Nor, the Court explained, may such limitations on relief be found in the
legislative history to section 703(h). Id. at 757-58.
73 Id. at 759-61. See H. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprinted in [1964]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2391; 110 CONG. REc. 7207, 7217, 12723 (1964). See generally
Vaas, Title VII. Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. R.v. 431 (1966).
" 424 U.S. at 761 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 12723 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
75 424 U.S. at 761.
76 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
7 Id. at 348; see note 6 and accompanying text supra.
78 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is authorized to "investigate and
act on a charge of a pattern or practice of discrimination. . . on behalf of a person claiming
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that no seniority system could be "bona fide" within the ambit of
section 703(h) if it tended to perpetuate past discrimination.7 9 The
Teamsters Court rejected this argument, however, stating that its
acceptance would "disembowel" section 703(h) and thwart the con-
gressional policy of protecting the vested seniority rights of em-
ployees.80 Noting that "Congress did not intend to make it illegal
for employees with vested seniority rights to continue to exercise
those rights, even at the expense of pre-Act discriminatees," 81 the
Teamsters Court held that an otherwise bona fide seniority system
is immunized under Title VII from challenges that it perpetuates
pre-Title VII discrimination. e2
The Teamsters Court never reached the questions of what
constitutes "bona fides" and which party has the burden of proof
on those issues, since the Government had conceded that the se-
niority system involved had been negotiated and maintained free
from any illegal purpose.8 3 Since the policy behind section 703(h)
was the congressional intent to immunize seniority rights absent a
showing of overt discrimination, 84 it would seem that after Team-
sters, it is necessary to establish that invidious discrimination mo-
tivated the adoption, negotiation, or maintenance of the seniority
system. Without such proof of invidious discrimination, there can
be no violation of section 703(a). The traditional civil litigation
burden, therefore, remains on the plaintiff to prove the lack of
bona fides in order to establish a violation. This emphasis on dis-
criminatory intent places seniority systems squarely under the dis-
to be aggrieved. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1976).
70 431 U.S. at 353.
80 Id.
11 Id. at 354. The Court in expressing its sweeping interpretation of section 703(h)
stated:
Although a seniority system inevitably tends to perpetuate the effects of pre-Act
discrimination. . . the Congressional judgment was that Title VII should not out-
law the use of existing seniority lists and thereby destroy or water down the
vested seniority rights of employees simply because their employer had engaged in
discrimination prior to the passage of the Act.
Id. at 352-53.
82 Id. at 353-54.
83 See id. at 355-56. Subsequent to Teamsters some courts have suggested that the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the alleged discrimination should be scrutinized to
determine bona fides. See, e.g., Winfield v. St. Joe Paper Co., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1103,
1131 (N.D. Fla. 1979); Swint v. Pullman Standard, 17 Fair Empl. Prae. Cas. 730, 739 (N.D.
Ala. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 624 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1980).
", See notes 80-82 and accompanying text supra.
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parate treatment burden of proof analysis.85 Since the plaintiffs in
cases of disparate treatment carry the ultimate burden of persua-
sion on the issue of the defendant's good or bad subjective intent,"8
it would seem to follow that the plaintiffs in a section 703(h) case
carry the similar burden of showing that a system is not "bona
fide." The view that the plaintiff has the burden of showing the
lack of bona fides of a seniority system is also supported by several
longstanding maxims of statutory interpretation.
MAXIMS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION FOR BURDENS OF PROOF AND
EXCEPTIONS
In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,87 the Supreme Court em-
phasized that Title VII plaintiffs "have the traditional civil litiga-
tion burden of establishing that the acts they complain of consti-
tuted discrimination in violation of Title VII."' Plaintiffs cannot
meet their traditional burden of persuasion unless they prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the existence of an "unlawful em-
ployment practice."8 9
It is a general maxim of pleading and proof that a party who
seeks to except himself from a statute must prove that his case
85 By its terms, section 703(h) immunizes bona fide seniority systems "provided that
[differences in terms, conditions or privileges] are not the result of an intention to discrimi-
nate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
Prior to Teamsters, this intention proviso of section 703(h) offered little assistance to defen-
dants, since under disparate impact analysis, the employer's good or bad subjective intent is
immaterial. See notes 28-29 and accompanying text supra. One court has stated that if "the
conduct engaged in had racially-determined effects, the requisite intent may be inferred
from the fact that the defendants persisted in the conduct after its racial implication had
become known to them." Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States,
416 F.2d 980, 997 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
The question arises whether the Supreme Court contemplated different approaches to
the determination of bona fides and the application of the intention proviso. In discussing
bona fides in a footnote to Teamsters, Mr. Justice Stewart explained that a seniority system
may have its genesis in discrimination "if an intent to discriminate entered into its very
adoption." 431 U.S. at 346 n.28. The Court apparently believed that such intention at the
time of adoption, insofar as it warranted a finding of unlawful genesis and non-bona fides,
was also sufficient to make a seniority system fail to satisfy the intention proviso of section
703(h). See Note, The New Definition of Seniority System Violations Under Title VII: "He
Who Seeks Equity .... ," 56 TEx. L. Rav. 301, 317 (1978).
8 See notes 13-16 and accompanying text supra.
87 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
" Id. at 137 n.14 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
"' See note 10 supra.
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falls within the exception, 0 unless application of the statute is
conditioned on the nonexistence of the exception.91 This maxim
seemingly is applicable where a statute, such as section 703 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, creates a substantive right while simulta-
neously providing for exceptions to that right.92 The maxim is eas-
ier to state than to apply, however, since it is not always clear from
the face of a statute whether the nonexistence of an exception is
made a condition to its application. One must scrutinize the gen-
eral clause to determine whether it incorporates the exception di-
rectly, by specific reference, or indirectly, by policy, legislative his-
tory, or proximity. A look at some examples indicates that if an
exception is designed to define, limit, or clarify a substantive right
simultaneously conferred, then the party asserting the benefits of
the substantive right should have the burden of proving that the
definition, limitation, or clarification does not destroy his claim to
the substantive right.
Exception Incorporated Within the General Clause. Freight
forwarders, for example, are subject to the permit provisions of
Part IV of the Interstate Commerce Act.9 3 A "freight forwarder" is
90 See, e.g., Everts v. Jorgensen, 227 Iowa 818, 289 N.W. 11, 13 (1939); Clubb v. Hetzel,
165 Kan. 594, 198 P.2d 142, 147 (1948); Hunter v. American Ry. Express, 4 S.W.2d 847, 850
(Mo. Ct. App. 1928). Similarly, a party must also prove that he comes within a statutory
exception. Sherman Inv. Co. v. United States, 199 F.2d 504, 507 (8th Cir. 1952); Automatic
Canteen Co. v. FTC, 194 F.2d 433, 438 (7th Cir. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 346 U.S. 61
(1953); see Sullivan v. Ward, 304 Mass. 614, 24 N.E.2d 672, 673 (1939). But see Schlemmer
v. Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Ry., 205 U.S. 1, 10 (1907).
91 See, e.g., Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Swink, 222 Ala. 496, 132 So. 728, 729 (1931). The
Swink court stated:
If there be an exception in the enacting clause, the party pleading must show that
his adversary is not within the exception; but if there be an exception in a subse-
quent clause or subsequent statute, that is a matter of defense, and is to be shown
by the other party.
Id.
This maxim of statutory interpretation is derived from the common law approach to
contract interpretation. In pleading on a contract, under common law, if a general clause is
followed by a separate, distinct clause which effectively removes something from the general
clause, the party pleading the general clause need not prove the negative of the exception
clause. He must so prove, however, if the exception is incorporated into the general clause.
J. GOULD, PLEADING, §§ 20-21 (1972); 2 J. SAUNDERS, PLEADING & EVIDENCE 1025-26 (2d ed.
1973).
92 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976). Simply stated, section 703(a) proscribes "unlawful
employment practices." Id. § 2000e-2(a) (1976); see note 10 supra. Section 703(h) immu-
nizes "bona fide seniority or merit" systems from the operation of section 703(a), provided
those systems do not reflect "an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976); see note 3 supra.
9" See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1022 (1976 & Supp. lI 1978).
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defined in section 1002(a)(5) of that act,94 but "shipper associa-
tions" are specifically precluded from regulation by section
1002(c).9 5 Confronting the question of who had the burden of prov-
ing that a shipper association did or did not fall within the statu-
tory exception, one court held that the burden is on the party as-
serting that an entity does not meet the statutory definition of a
shipper association. Important to this conclusion was the deter-
mination that the legislative history and the administering agency
regarded the section 1002(c) preclusion as a clarification of the sec-
tion 1002(a)(5) definition, and not as a separate exemption.9 7 The
party asserting the applicability of the general clause thus had the
burden of proving that the clarification, which would have emascu-
lated the general clause, did not apply even though the clarifica-
tion appeared in a different subsection.98
Exception Styled as Special Defense Not Located in Statute
That Creates the Claim. Where the statutory provision is intended
as something more than a mere clarification of the general clause,
however, the burden of proof will be allocated differently. One
such provision in the Bank Merger Act of 1966"" provides banks
with a defense or justification for potential antitrust violations if
"the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly
outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the
transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the commu-
nity to be served."'100 In an action brought by the United States
challenging two bank mergers as violative of section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act,1' 1 the Supreme Court held that the banks had the burden
of proving that they came within the Bank Merger Act exception,
citing the "general rule where one claims the benefits of an excep-
tion to the prohibition of a statute." 02 The Court reasoned that
Congress apparently regarded the provision as a distinct exception
See 49 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (1976).
See id. § 1002(c) (1976).
National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 242 F. Supp. 601, 605 (D.D.C.
1965) (citing Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 175 F.2d 808, 818 (1949)).
97 242 F. Supp. at 605 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1172, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1941)).
98 See National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 242 F. Supp. 601, 605
(D.D.C. 1965). See also Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363 U.S. 405, 406-08 (1960).
9 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
100 Id. § 1828(c)(5)(B).
101 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976 & Supp. H 1978).
102 United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 366 (1967) (citing FTC v. Mor-
ton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1948)); accord, SEC v. American Int'l Say. & Loan Ass'n,
199 F. Supp. 341 (D. Md. 1961).
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to the general antitrust laws, and referred to the remarks of several
congressmen that the banks should shoulder the burden of
proof.10 3
Exception Appearing in Separate Section of Statute That
Creates the Claim. The Fair Labor Standards Act'04 (FLSA) regu-
lates minimum wages and maximum hours, with general prohibi-
tions set forth in sections 206 and 207.105 Congress created exemp-
tions from these prohibitions, however, and placed them in a
different section of the FLSA,10 6 thus styling them in the nature of
affirmative defenses rather than clarifications. Accordingly, the
cases under the FLSA have held that the employer has the burden
of proving that any of the exemptions apply.
10 7
Section 703(h) of Title VII
In Title VII actions challenging the bona fides of a seniority
system, successful application by an employer of the general max-
ims on exceptions will turn on convincing a court that the language
of section 703(h)'0 s was not intended as an affirmative defense, but
rather as an explanation or clarification of what constitutes an un-
lawful employment practice under section 703(a). 09 Franks110 and
Teamsters"' offer the best ammunition for this argument. In
Franks, the Court's review of the legislative history led to the con-
clusion that "the thrust [of section 703(h)] is directed toward de-
fining what is and is not an illegal discriminatory practice."" 2 Sen-
103 386 U.S. at 366.
10- 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. H 1978).
105 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (1976 & Supp. H 1978).
'0' See 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1976 & Supp. H 1978). Section 213, captioned "Exemptions,"
includes an exemption for a "bona fide executive" from the proscriptions of sections 206 and
207. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
17 See, e.g., Wirtz v. Modem Trashmoval, Inc., 323 F.2d 451, 464 (4th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 925 (1964); Wirtz v. Patelos Door Corp., 280 F. Supp. 212, 216 (E.D.N.C.
1968). Important to this conclusion is the maxim that exemptions to a remedial statute are
to be narrowly construed. See note 115 infra.
,08 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). The employer could also argue that in enacting Title
VII, Congress knew how to frame an affirmative defense which places the burden on the
employer, but apparently chose not to phrase section 703(h) in such a way. Cf. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-12(b) (1976) (providing immunity if the employer can prove his conduct in good faith
and pursuant to EEOC interpretations).
109 See note 10 supra.
110 424 U.S. 747 (1976); see notes 70-75 and accompanying text supra.
m 431 U.S. 324 (1977); see notes 6, 76-82 and accompanying text supra.
11 424 U.S. at 758-61. In Teamsters the Supreme Court reiterated its holding in
Franks, but noted that Franks merely reflected the "general purpose" of section 703(h), and
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ator Humphrey told Congress that section 703(h) "merely clarifies
[Title VII's] intent and effect,"11 and the draftsmen stated that
one of the principal goals of section 703(h) was to resolve ambigui-
ties in earlier drafts of Title VII.114
As a clarification or definition of what constitutes an "illegal
employment practice," and since it closely follows the language in
section 703(a), section 703(h) should be read as part of the general
clause which confers the substantive right. Therefore, the nonexist-
ence of the exception is a condition to the application of section
703(a), and a party asserting rights under that statute should have
the burden of proving that a seniority system is not bona fide. 15
THE BURDEN OF PROOF QUESTION AFTER Teamsters
While the Supreme Court's retreat from disparate impact
analysis in cases concerning seniority systems suggests an emerging
emphasis on a showing of discriminatory motive or lack of bona
fides as part of a disparate treatment analysis,""' none of the
that a much more rigorous statutory analysis was necessary to resolve the controversy at
issue. 431 U.S. at 346-67.
113 110 CONG. REC. 12723 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) (quoted in International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 352).
114 See 431 U.S. at 352; cf. EEOC v. McCall Corp., 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 5448,
5451 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (section 703(h) "delineates" those employment practices which are
illegal and those which are not).
115 On the other hand, plaintiffs are entitled to the counter-argument that exceptions to
a remedial statute such as Title VII are to be narrowly construed. See California Brewers
Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 611 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The California Brewers
plurality did not mention the maxim that exemptions to remedial statutes are to be nar-
rowly construed. On the contrary, the Court stated that the Congress that enacted Title VII
"quite evidently intended to exempt from the normal operation of Title VII [seniority sys-
tems coming in all] sizes and shapes." Id. at 607.
Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 730 (N.D. Ala. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds, 624 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1980), is the only case where the statutory construc-
tion of section 703(h) was explored in any depth. The district court in Swint concluded that
section 703(h) was an "affirmative defense," with the defendants bearing the burden of
proof on the issue of bona fides. 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 732. Accord, Griffin v. Cop-
perweld Steel Co., 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 30,637 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
116 See California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 607, 608 (1980); International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977); United Air Lines, Inc. v.
Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977). Disparate treatment necessarily involves proof of discrimi-
natory motive by employers. See notes 16 & 17 and accompanying text supra. Employment
practices which have a disparate impact on minorities, by contrast, are "facially neutral in
their treatment" but in fact hurt one group more than another. 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15
(1977); see text accompanying notes 28-29 supra. The Court in Teamsters noted that the
main aim of Title VII was to stop disparate treatment. Id. at 335 n.15. Similarly, in Evans,
the Court rejected a female plaintiff's discrimination claim because she did not "attack the
SENIORITY SYSTEMS
Court's decisions has dealt specifically with the question of burden
of proof. Lower courts, forced to confront the issue amid compli-
cated fact patterns, have in effect been left in the woods without a
map. For the most part, however, courts addressing the issue of
bona fides117 have analyzed seniority practices under the four fac-
tors extracted from Teamsters by the Fifth Circuit in James v.
Stockham Valves & Fittings Co."18 Under the James four-part
analysis, a court will consider whether a seniority system applies
evenly to employees of all races:
1) whether the seniority system operates to discourage all em-
ployees equally from transferring between seniority units;
2) whether the seniority units are in the same or separate bar-
gaining units (if the latter, whether that structure is rational and
in conformance with industry practice);
3) whether the seniority system had its genesis in racial discrin-
ination; and
4) whether the system was negotiated and has been maintained
free from any illegal purpose.11
The Fourth Circuit's Approach
A close examination of the recent cases in the Fourth Circuit
involving seniority systems highlights the judicial need for theoret-
ical, conceptual guidance on the burden of proof question. In
Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co.,120 a three-judge panel recognized that
disparate impact analysis could not be used to challenge a depart-
mental seniority system which fixed layoff and recall rights.121
Judge Field, writing for the unanimous court, stated that seniority
systems represent "[tihe one exception [to the] application of the
prima facie 'disparate impact' principle.1 1 22 The implication of the
bona fides" of the system and there was no allegation of intentional discrimination. 431 U.S.
553, 560 (1977). Most recently, in California Brewers, the Court noted that on remand re-
spondent could win by showing an "intention to discriminate because of race." 444 U.S. at
611 (emphasis added).
17 See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1189 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979); Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 445 F. Supp.
421, 436 (W.D. Wash. 1977).
118 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978).
119 559 F.2d at 352. It should be noted that it is beyond the scope of this paper to enter
into an extended discussion of the probative value that should be assigned to the various
pieces of evidence offered under the four-factor bona fides framework.
120 585 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979).
121 585 F.2d at 636.
122 Id.
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Sledge court was clear; a challenge to the bona fides of a seniority
system requires that the plaintiffs show that the alleged discrimi-
natory practices were "racially motivated.' 1 23 Indeed, since proof
of racial motivation is tantamount to a finding of "discriminatory
purpose" in the adoption or maintenance of the system-a factor
crucial to a finding of a lack of bona fides-it seems logical that
plaintiffs should bear this burden. The Sledge decision thus dem-
onstrates a judicial awareness of the different concepts of discrimi-
nation and their accompanying burdens of proof. Moreover, it sug-
gests that a burden of proof argument framed in terms of disparate
treatment might get a receptive hearing in the Fourth Circuit.124
Circuit Judge Widener, sitting as a district judge by designa-
tion in Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 125 has given
the clearest indication of who bears the burden on the question of
bona fides after Teamsters. In his original opinion on liability,
Judge Widener found Glamorgan's seniority system to be in viola-
tion of Title VII.126 The Supreme Court, however, decided Franks
and Teamsters subsequent to that opinion, and in light of those
decisions, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated
Judge Widener's opinion, stating cryptically: "Teamsters makes
clear who has the burden of proof of a prima facie case, how one
may be proved and how the burden of proof may shift thereaf-
ter.' 127 On remand, Judge Widener noted that the success of a
12 See id. at 635. The Fourth Circuit in Sledge did not have to assess the plaintiffs'
claim under disparate treatment analysis because Teamsters was decided after the district
court had rendered its decision, and the plaintiffs in their original complaint did not chal-
lenge the bona fides of the seniority system. Id. at 636.
124 Cf. Wright v. National Archives & Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 713 (4th Cir. 1979)
(the integrity of disparate impact as a "rational judicial construct. . . should not be com-
promised by undisciplined extensions"). See also Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d
696 (8th Cir. 1980). Although the Sledge opinion does not address a challenge to seniority
practices, the "critical issue of discriminatory motive" would seem to logically match the
critical issue of proving the non-bona fides of a seniority system in a section 703(h) case. By
parallel reasoning, then, defendants should approach a court with the theory that, since
proof of discriminatory motive is mandatory for a finding of non-bona fides, the ultimate
burden of persuasion rests with plaintiffs. See Kohne v. IMCO Container Co., 480 F. Supp.
1015 (W.D. Va. 1979).
125 20 Fair EmpL. Prac. Cas. 766 (W.D. Va. 1979), aff'd, 621 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam).
12 418 F. Supp. 743, 764 (W.D. Va. 1976), vacated and remanded, 561 F.2d 563 (4th
Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
12 Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 561 F.2d 563, 565 (4th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam). The Fourth Circuit's cursory statement in Younger that "Teamsters makes clear
who has the burden of proof," id., does not mark the first time that a court has failed to
anticipate the evolution of judicial thinking on section 703(h). Cf. United States v. Jackson-
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plaintiff's attack on the "current operation of a seniority system"
requires "proof that the system was adopted or maintained for a
discriminatory purpose."12 In examining the evidence offered on
bona fides, and applying the four-factor analysis suggested by
Teamsters,129 Judge Widener found that the plaintiffs had failed
to prove a lack of bona fides by Glamorgan.1 30 In so ruling, Judge
Widener apparently construed the Fourth Circuit's remand order
to mean that the plaintiff carries the burden of proving non-bona
fides. 1 31
Recent Cases Exploring the Burden of Proof Issue
Before a court can address the issue of bona fides, it must de-
termine the threshold issue of whether various practices are or are
not components of a "seniority system. 13 2 Failure to characterize a
ville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 447 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972)
(Griggs "may be the last word" on the issue of the consequences of past discrimination on
present seniority systems); EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 419 F. Supp. 1022, 1048
(E.D. Pa. 1976), afl'd, 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977) (Franks "authoritatively interpreted"
section 703(h)).
128 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 784. Judge Widener first made a preliminary determina-
tion that Glamorgan's "no-transfer" rule was part of a seniority system. Id. at 783. The no-
transfer rule provided that an employee who transferred from one department to another
would lose all seniority accumulated in the prior department. Id. Other practices also have
been held to be part and parcel of a seniority system. See, e.g., Alexander v. Aero Lodge No.
735, International Ass'n of Machinists, 565 F.2d 1364, 1378-79 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 946 (1978); Griffin v. Copperweld Steel Co., 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 30,637
(N.D. Ohio 1979); Kohne v. IMCO Container Co., 480 F. Supp. 1015 (W.D. Va. 1979); Free-
man v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 5 30,090 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
129 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 785; see notes 118-119 and accompanying text supra.
130 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 788. Judge Widener observed that the only "substantive
attack" on bona fides concerned the maintenance and operation of the security system, but
he dismissed this attack because the "plaintiffs provided not a single witness" in support of
their claim. Id. at 787. See also Coleman v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 18 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 8812 (E.D. Va. 1978).
Judge Widener's opinion appears to have foreshadowed Justice Stewart's language in
California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598 (1980). Compare Younger v. Glamorgan
Pipe & Foundry Co., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 784 with California Brewers Ass'n v. Bry-
ant, 444 U.S. at 610-11.
1 See Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 621 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam), af'g, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 776 (W.D. Va. 1979). In affirming Judge Widener's
opinion, the Fourth Circuit stated that "[a]ny doubt concerning the [lower] court's interpre-
tation of the statutory language of § 703(h) was resolved by the decision of the Supreme
Court in California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant ... " 621 F.2d at 97 (citation omitted). See
note 127 supra.
132 Bona fides analysis, of course, cannot enter the picture until a given practice is in-
terpreted to be part of the "seniority system." See note 133 and accompanying text infra.
An additional question generated by Teamsters, and perhaps still open after California
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practice as part of the seniority system usually results in applica-
tion of disparate impact analysis wherein the defendant carries the
difficult burden of proving the "business necessity" of the practice.
The pivotal nature of defining a practice as part of a "seniority
system" is typified by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Cali-
fornia Brewers Association v. Bryant."'3 In that case, the plaintiffs
challenged a 20-year-old provision in statewide brewery industry
collective bargaining agreements that defined "permanent em-
ployee," for purposes of benefit and competitive seniority, as an
employee who had worked at least 45 weeks in one calendar
year.134 In the California brewery industry, permanent employees
have preference over temporary employees with respect to layoffs,
recall, bumping, unemployment benefits, wages, vacation choice,
and pay.135 Because of the changing nature of the business, it had
become "virtually impossible" for any employee-black or
white-to satisfy the 45-week requirement.3 8 The plaintiffs, an
uncertified class of temporary, black employees, brought suit under
Title VII challenging the practice as discriminatory.1 3 7
The Ninth Circuit ruled that the practice was not part of a
bona fide seniority system, but rather a classification device-like
the requirement of a high school diploma-to determine who could
Brewers, is whether the practice of awarding promotions on the basis of "qualifications plus
seniority" is entitled to bona fides scrutiny as part of a "seniority system." See Pate v.
Transit Dist., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1228, 1235 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (system of awarding
promotions on the basis of "seniority and qualifications" subjected to bona fides analysis). If
the term "qualifications" implies that prior experience in a particular job is required before
one can bid for a better job, as in the typical line of progression, the promotion practice
would be part of a seniority system. See California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598,
607 n.17 (1980). See also Edmonds v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
1052, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 1979). Several cases suggest that if promotions are awarded on the
basis of seniority where "qualifications" are essentially equal, the promotion practice is enti-
tled to section 703(h) protection if the system is bona fide. See, e.g., Movement for Opportu-
nity & Equality v. Detroit Diesel, 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 557, 569 (S.D. Ind. 1978); Win-
field v. St. Joe Paper Co., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1497, 1503 (N.D. Fla. 1977), motion for
summary judgment denied, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1103 (N.D. Fla. 1979). Cf. Cartagena v.
Secretary of Navy, 618 F.2d 130, 134-35 (1st Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (practice of according
priority to employees who had previously held the position in question but had been de-
moted through no fault of their own, in part of a seniority system and thus suitable for bona
fides analysis).
133 444 U.S. 598 (1980).
4 Id. at 600-01.
'35 Id. at 603 & n.7.
I" Bryant v. California Brewers Ass'n, 585 F.2d 421, 424 (9th Cir. 1978), vacated and
remanded, 444 U.S. 598 (1980).
137 444 U.S. at 601.
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enter the seniority line.138 "Because the 45-week provision is not
part of a seniority system," the court concluded, "plaintiff is not
required to prove any form of intentional discrimination to make
out a Title VII violation."'1 9 Instead, the court would have allowed
plaintiff to proceed under the Griggs disparate impact analysis.
The implication from the court's language certainly seemed to be
that if the practice were part of the seniority system, the plaintiff
would have to prove lack of bona fides. The Supreme Court, in a
plurality opinion, vacated and remanded the lower court decision,
holding that the 45-week requirement was part of a "seniority sys-
tem.11 40 The Court concluded, therefore, that it was the plaintiffs'
responsibility "to show" that the system was not bona fide or that
differences produced by the system were "'the result of an inten-
tion to discriminate because of race.' ,,141
In Swint v. Pullman-Standard,1 4 2 however, Judge Pointer lik-
ened the section 703(h) exception to an affirmative defense, placing
the burden of proving bona fides on the defendants.1 43 The Swint
court squarely held that after the plaintiffs establish a prima facie
case of disparate impact, the defendants have the burden of prov-
ing that a challenged seniority system is bona fide.'" Alluding to
the statutory construction argument, Judge Pointer noted, but did
not agree, that defendants "could, with considerable logic, argue
that section 703(h) is interrelated with section 703(a) in delineat-
ing an 'unlawful employment practice,"' thereby placing on the
plaintiff "the burden of establishing inapplicability of section
703(h).' ' 45
If other courts similarly fail to characterize section 703(h) as a
1 585 F.2d at 427 & n.11.
139 Id.
140 444 U.S. at 610-11.
141 Id.
142 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 730 (N.D. Ala. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 624 F.2d 525
(5th Cir. 1980).
143 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 732. In two recent decisions, Judge Pointer has contin-
ued to place on defendants the "burden of persuasion" on the issue of a bona fide seniority
system. See Faulkner v. Republic Steel Corp., 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. T 30,698 (N.D. Ala.
1979); Terrell v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1695 (N.D.
Ala. 1979).
144 Id. Although Judge Pointer's decision in Swint was subsequently reversed by the
Fifth Circuit, Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525, 536 (5th Cir. 1980), that court did
not address the issue of allocbting the burden of proof on the bona fides issue.
14 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 732 (citing Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,
758 (1976)); see notes 108-115 and accompanying text supra.
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clarification or delineation of section 703(a), a defendant may be
successful in avoiding an unfavorable burden of proof allocation by
relying on the policies underlying disparate impact and disparate
treatment analysis. Notably, the Supreme Court in Teamsters res-
cued seniority systems from disparate treatment analysis by attrib-
uting to section 703(h) a congressional intent and policy that se-
niority rights not be diluted without evidence of overt
discrimination. 14 6 The Swint court arguably failed to recognize
that policy, as evidenced by Judge Pointer's reliance1 47 on Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. Griggs, however, concerned the Title VII policy of
prohibiting the artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers which
perpetuate past discrimination. 148 Teamsters made clear, however,
that in enacting section 703(h), Congress determined that seniority
systems are not artificial, arbitrary, or unnecessary barriers to
equal employment opportunity.14
9
The uncertainty after Teamsters in allocating the burden of
proving bona fides lies in the fact that courts have allocated that
burden-albeit not uniformly-without clearly indicating their ap-
proach to the issue.150 In other words, the cases have not revealed
whether the allocation of the burden was based on a statutory con-
struction theory," a disparate impact 52 or disparate treatment
theory, 15 3 or simply on the four-factor bona fides framework.15 '
One court,155 for example, recognized the "debate" between the
146 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 353.
147 See 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 732. Judge Pointer also placed reliance on Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), another disparate impact case dealing
with the present effects of past discrimination, id. at 425. See 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at
732.
.4 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 431; see text accompanying notes 50-51
supra.
14I See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 353-54. The
Teamsters Court expressly stated that it would be a "perversion of the congressional pur-
pose" to hold that any seniority system which perpetuates pre-Title VII discrimination can-
not be bona fide. Id. at 353.
I" See, e.g., Acha v. Beame, 570 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1978); Southbridge Plastics Div. v.
Local 759, International Union of Rubber Workers, 565 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978); James v.
Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034
(1978).
"' See text accompanying notes 108-09 supra.
12 See text accompanying note 144 supra.
153 See text accompanying note 86 supra.
'54 See text accompanying note 119 supra.
"I See Broadnax v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 20 Empl. Prab. Dec. (CCH) 11,692 (E.D. Ark.
1978). In Broadnax, an action was brought alleging discrimination in the defendant rail-
road's age and minimum education requirements, promotion practices, and seniority system.
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parties over who bears the burden of proving bona fides, yet the
court "assume[d], without deciding that the defendants were re-
quired to bear the burden of establishing that this seniority system
was entitled to the immunity conferred by statute. '156
Not surprisingly, the failure to articulate a policy-based stan-
dard for allocating the burden of proving the bona fides of an al-
leged discriminatory seniority system has resulted in a split of au-
thority on that issue. Although Swint v. Pullman-Standard clearly
holds that the defendant has the burden of proving that its system
is bona fide, 1 7 there is authority from district courts within the
Fifth Circuit which indicates that the plaintiff must prove the non-
bona fides of an alleged discriminatory system. In Harris v. Ana-
conda Aluminum Co., 158 the plaintiffs attacked a promotion prac-
tice which, in accordance with a plant-wide seniority program, gave
preference to employees from within the same division.1 59 After
finding that the divisional preference was part of a seniority sys-
tem,160 the court applied the James four-factor analysis to con-
clude that the system was bona fide.16" ' Although the Harris court
did not state which party had the burden of proof, the court did
state in its lengthy opinion that the "[p]laintiffs. . .must prove a
racially discriminatory purpose to prevail on their claims . . .of
'disparate treatment' under Title VII, e16 2 and that "the ultimate
issue is intentional discrimination in the creation or maintenance
of a seniority system.' 63 The entire tenor of the court's discussion
Id. at 11,708. The court examined the promotion practices using disparate treatment analy-
sis, and applied disparate impact analysis in reviewing the age and minimum education re-
quirements. Id. at 11,695-701. The focus of the plaintiffs' claim, however, was on the com-
pany's seniority system which included a no-transfer rule. Id. at 11,708-10. While noting
that this challenge had to be analyzed strictly "in the wake of Teamsters," the Broadnax
court merely assumed "without deciding" that the defendant bore the burden of proving his
good faith. Id. at 11,708.
125 Id.
157 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 732; see note 144 and accompanying text supra.
158 479 F. Supp. 11 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
'9 Id. at 22. Since a transferring employee would come into the new division at a bot-
tom level job, the plaintiffs argued that the divisional preference discouraged blacks from
transferring to divisions from which they historically had been excluded. Id. at 23.
160 Id. at 28. Relying on a footnote in Teamsters, see 431 U.S. at 355 n.41, the court
concluded that section 703(h) protected the "divisional aspects of [a] seniority system which
could operate to protect less senior plantwide employees over more senior plantwide em-
ployees. . . ." 479 F. Supp. at 27; accord, Pate v. Transit District, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
1228 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
161 479 F. Supp. at 28-33.
162 Id. at 21.
163 Id. at 29.
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of section 703(h) suggests that in its view, the plaintiffs had failed
to carry their burden of proving non-bona fides.
The significance of the Harris decision on the section 703(h)
burden of proof issue is clouded, however, by the equivocal lan-
guage in two other decisions from district courts within the Fifth
Circuit.16 4 In Scarlett v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 165 the plaintiffs
moved for an adjudication that they had established a prima facie
case of non-bona fides in the defendant's seniority system. 6 In
denying their motion, Judge Alaimo stated, "If plaintiffs are suc-
cessful in proving that the seniority system is not bona fide and
that it perpetuates the effects of pre-Act discrimination, they will
have proved their case under Title VII. ' '16 7 Subsequently, however,
the court examined materials submitted by the parties at trial,
and, applying the James four-factor bona fides framework, found
that even though the plaintiffs had established the requisite se-
niority, they had never been called for promotion. " While this
alone might have stripped the seniority system of section 703(h)
protection, the plaintiffs also had elicited testimony that the de-
fendants maintained the system, at least in part, for the purpose of
racial discrimination.16 9 Although "[a]rguably the burden was on
the defendants,' 17 0 the Scarlett court concluded that--"[e]ven
placing the burden on the plaintiffs"-the plaintiffs' evidence es-
tablished that the system was not bona fide.171
In Winfield v. St. Joe Paper Co.,1 72 the other district court
decision within the Fifth Circuit to have hedged on the burden of
proof issue, a class action was brought alleging discrimination in
' See Scarlett v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 30,123, opin-
ion after trial, 21 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 30,320 (S.D. Ga. 1979); Winfield v. St. Joe
Paper Co., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1497 (N.D. Fla. 1977). But see Fowler v. Birmingham
News Co., 608 F.2d 1055, 1057 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 470 F.
Supp. 649, 652 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Freeman v. Motor Convoy, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
30,090, at 11, 493 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
10 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 30,123, opinion after trial, 21 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
30,320.
10 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 11,649.
Id. at 11,648.
1 Id. at 11,649. While the seniority system dictated that the order in which trainmen
were "called" to take promotional examinations for conductor positions was based on se-
niority, black trainmen had been by-passed in favor of less senior white employees. Id.
109 Id. at 11,650.
170 21 Empl. Prac. Dec. 30,320, at 12,728.
171 Id.
171 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1497 (N.D. Fla. 1977).
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several of the defendant's employment practices.173 In granting the
plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint in light of Teamsters,
the court stated that the "plaintiffs must be accorded an opportu-
nity to demonstrate that the seniority provisions. . . are purposely
discriminatory or 'have their genesis in racial discrimination.' ,14
The intimation was that the plaintiffs would have the burden of
proving the non-bona fides of the seniority system. Yet, on the
plaintiffs' subsequent motion for a preliminary injunction,7 5 the
court concluded that it was "unnecessary in the current instance to
resolve the issue of assigning the burden of proof" since it would
not affect the outcome of the court's decision. 76 Since the plain-
tiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits regard-
ing post-Act discrimination in hiring and job assignment, 7 7 retro-
active seniority status could be granted under the Franks rationale
without attacking the legality of the seniority system. 78 Neverthe-
less, the court denied the preliminary injunction since there was no
showing that irreparable harm was likely to result. 7
There are decisions of district courts within other circuits as
well which indicate that the plaintiff must bear the burden of
proof on section 703(h) bona fides.5 0 In Dickerson v. United
173 Id. at 1500.
174 Id. at 1504.
171 Winfield v. St. Joe Paper Co., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1103 (N.D. Fla. 1979).
171 Id. at 1130. Although not deciding the issue, the Winfield court did note the split in
authority over the assignment of proving section 703(h) bona fides. See id. at 1129-30. In a
subsequent certification proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), however, Judge Stafford once
again confronted the burden of proof issue. The plaintiffs moved for a determination of the
appealability of the court's earlier ruling that the seniority system was bona fide. Winfield v.
St. Joe Paper Co., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1144, 1145 (N.D. Fla. 1979). The court denied
the motion, noting that "[t]his court's determination that insufficient facts have been
presented to establish that the system is not bona fide is not the proper subject of a §
1292(b) appeal.. . ." Id. at 1146 (emphasis added).
177 Id. at 1129. The court concluded that as a result of discrimination "in the initial
assignment of blacks to the lowliest jobs in the plant," both before and after the effective
date of Title VII, the plaintiffs had been "victims of institutionalized discrimination." Id.
"7 Id.; see notes 70-72 and accompanying text supra. As for the victims of pre-Act
discrimination in employment, the Winfield court noted that a preliminary injunction
would clearly have been warranted under a "perpetuation of past discrimination" theory. 20
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1129. But since "Teamsters [had] totally changed the rules of the
game," the court held that a preliminary injunction could not issue absent a showing that
the seniority system was non-bona fide. Id.
79 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1137.
110 See, e.g., Trent v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 448, 451 (W.D. Pa. 1979);
Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 822, 824 (N.D. Ind. 1977).
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States Steel Corp.,81 the court held that a no-transfer rule was
protected as part of a bona fide system under section 703(h) where
the "[p]laintiffs have not presented any evidence that the practice
of maintaining the separate units is not 'rational, [and] in accord
with the industry practices.' "182 A fair reading of the case would
suggest that Judge Newcomer placed at least the burden of pro-
duction on plaintiffs, if not the burden of persuasion. 83 In a recent
case involving a seniority system with advancement dependent
upon qualification plus seniority, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California squarely placed on the
plaintiff the burden of proving non-bona fides. In Edmonds v.
Southern Pacific Transportation Co.,18 4 the plaintiffs' single wit-
ness on the bona fides issue testified merely as to the alleged po-
tential discriminatory effects of a recent collective bargaining
agreement. 85 The Edmonds court expressly stated this showing of
mere potential discrimination was not sufficient for the plaintiffs
to sustain "their burden of proving that the seniority systems in-
volved are not bona fide under § 703(h)."'' 86 Indeed, applying a de-
tailed four-factor analysis, the court repeatedly emphasized that
the "plaintiffs presented no evidence" on any of the factors suffi-
cient to support a finding of non-bona fides. 1 7
In the wake of Teamsters, courts continue to struggle with the
issue of which party bears the burden of proving bona fides or lack
thereof under section 703(h).1'8 Indeed, in light of the significance
181 439 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1977), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom.
Worthy v. Dickerson, 616 F.2d 698 (3d Cir. 1980).
182 Id. at 73 (quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at
355).
183 When Dickerson is read in conjunction with Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F.2d 1138
(E.D. Pa. 1977), an earlier opinion by Judge Newcomer, it appears evident that Judge New-
comer is willing to differ with the Swint approach, see text accompanying note 144 supra,
and to place on the plaintiff the burden of proving that a seniority system is not bona fide.
See Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F.2d at 1187.
1" 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1052 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
185 Id. at 1071-72.
188 Id. at 1071.
181 Id. at 1077-78.
I" Several commentators, discussing the effects of Teamsters, have suggested that the
burden is on plaintiffs to prove the non-bona fides of a seniority system. See, e.g., S. ACID,
EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION 537 (2d ed. 1978); Note, Executive Order 11,246 and Reverse Dis-
crimination Challenges: Presidential Authority to Require Affirmative Action, 54 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 376, 381 n.35 (1979); Note, Title VII in the Supreme Court: Equal Employment Op-
portunity Bows to Seniority Rights, 1978 UTAH L. REv. 249, 261-62. See generally Oversight
on Federal Enforcement of Equal Employment Opportunity Laws: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th
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of the question, Supreme Court resolution appears inevitable.
CONCLUSION
Few other areas of the law present the same demands on par-
ties, counsel, and the courts as does the field of employment dis-
crimination litigation. Past, present, and future employees, in clas-
ses and subclasses, must often weave, and the employer must
address, a complex case of statistical disparity merged with claims
of individual and systematic wrongdoing. It is not surprising that
in this context a number of suits filed in the infancy of Title VII
litigation are still inching their way to resolution. Along the way,
these cases have helped establish some of the parameters of Title
VII. Yet, prior findings of liability in many of these cases must now
be reconsidered,5 9 and all future cases involving seniority systems
must be examined, in the wake of California Brewers and
Teamsters.
Resolution of the burden of proof and bona fides questions
may depend on whether courts read section 703(h) as an affirma-
tive defense, or as a clarification of the general proscriptions of sec-
tion 703(a). Since a result-oriented court is free to choose the se-
mantic approach that supports its purpose, a complete argument
should address the different policies underlying the disparate
treatment and impact concepts of discrimination. The allocation,
quality, and quantity of burden of proof all depend on which of
these basic concepts of discrimination is applied. In dealing now
with seniority systems and burden of proof, the courts need careful
briefing by litigants that builds upon these well-established con-
cepts of discrimination. The challenge is to coordinate the interest
protected by section 703(h)-legitimate seniority expectations of
incumbent employees are protected absent a discriminatory pur-
pose to the seniority system-with the interests protected by the
disparate treatment and impact approaches. Teamsters instructs
that Congress did not view seniority systems as artificial, arbitrary,
and unnecessary barriers, or as a built-in headwind. Rather, in en-
acting section 703(h), Congress considered that a seniority system
Cong., 2d Sess. 358-67 (1978) (Testimony of Barry Goldstein, Ass't Gen. Counsel for
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund).
189 See, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 920 (1976), aff'd in part and vacated and remanded in part in light of Teamsters,
586 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1978), reconsideration en banc granted, No. 78-1083 (4th Cir., April
2, 1979).
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designed to protect and define the past, present, and future rights
of employees is entitled to special protection, absent proof of in-
tentional discrimination. Since proof of discriminatory intent is re-
quired for a seniority system to be non-bona fide, disparate treat-
ment, which requires proof of discriminatory motive, is the proper
approach. Under that framework, the burden of proving unlawful
intent rests with plaintiffs. Absent such a showing, the statute and
the policy behind it have not been offended.
